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WHEN the most senior military commanders of a Latin American country feel compelled to make a public statement of their loyalty to the elected president, as Venezuela's did this week, it suggests that all is not well in the body politic. The same goes for a recent decision to give public workers, including the army, a Christmas bonus of three months' salary, instead of the usual two. Though Hugo Chavez, Venezuela's voluble and impulsive president, probably has little immediate cause to fear for his job, his difficulties are steadily mounting—and not just because relations between his government and the United States have sharply deteriorated since September 11th.

Mr Chavez, a former paratroop commander who claims to be leading a “Bolivarian revolution”, is still fairly popular. But his poll ratings are sliding—and so is the price of oil, the country's (and the government's) main source of income. That spells trouble. Mr Chavez trumpets his success in reviving OPEC, more than doubling the value of Venezuela's oil exports between 1998 and 2000. But the average price of Venezuela's oil has now fallen to $16.5 a barrel, below the $18.5 on which next year's budget is based.

The government can draw on some $7 billion it has squirrelled away in a “stabilisation fund”. That may allow it to stave off recession next year. But the scope for buying political popularity is limited. Oil apart, the economy has been sluggish: GDP is growing at around 3% a year, not enough to finance a serious attack on poverty. Open unemployment, at around 14%, remains high. Violent crime, the voters' other main concern, is at record levels.

All of that explains why, for the first time since 1998, Mr Chavez is no longer indisputably Venezuela's most trusted politician. In one poll, he is eclipsed by Alfredo Peña, the mayor of Caracas, and a former supporter. The president's approval rating has fallen from a high of some 90% to between 40% and 50%.

As ministers frequently point out, a presidential election is not due for another five years, since Mr Chavez sought and won a new term in July 2000 in an election held under a new constitution. But the president himself cites popular support, rather than his election victories (the first was in 1998), as the source of his legitimacy in what he calls a “participatory democracy”. Without it, he might be unusually isolated and vulnerable.

The electoral alliance Mr Chavez forged in 1998 is no more. Its second-largest component, the Movement to Socialism, is now in opposition. His own Fifth Republic Movement is fractured. Having been derided as the corrupt representatives of a moribund political order, the opposition is now vengefully casting around for constitutional ways to unseat Mr Chavez. Some opponents are seeking a referendum to revoke his mandate. Democratic Action, the largest opposition force, is to ask the Supreme Court to establish a board of psychiatrists to declare the president “mentally incompetent”.

Mr Chavez has more to fear from other quarters. One is organised labour. A government effort to wrest control of the Venezuelan Workers' Confederation failed last month, when its candidate appeared to come a poor second in a chaotic leadership election. Then there are the armed forces and their traditional ally, the United States. In their statement this week, the generals criticised rumour-mongers in the media, but also stressed the importance of media freedom, in a swipe at threats by the president against a critical television station.

Until recently, American officials had opted to ignore Mr Chavez's rhetoric, since his actions had been neither clearly undemocratic nor unfriendly to foreign capital, including American oil companies. However, after Mr Chavez accused the Americans of “the killing of innocents” in Afghanistan, the United States this week summoned its ambassador in Caracas to an ostentatious “high-level review” of its policy towards Venezuela.

Some analysts believe that Mr Chavez provoked this row, as a means of rallying the country. If so, that could be a risky action. Though the United States would be unwise to encourage the armed forces to remove the president, Mr Chavez might be prudent not to tempt them to do so.

So where is the “Bolivarian revolution” heading? Some pundits have predicted that setbacks would prompt the radicalisation of what has so far been a pretty tame affair. Long-promised (or long-threatened) laws to increase royalties paid by foreign oil companies, and to restrict the size of landholdings, are now close to being enacted by the government under emergency legislative powers. But Mr Chavez is less powerful than he was two years ago. Wherever he may be tempted to lead it, his country will not necessarily follow.